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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-4-103(2)(j) confers jurisdiction on this Court to decide 
this appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion in granting Appellee’s Renewed Motion to 
Set Aside the Entry of Default (1) where the trial court considered and found a 
meritorious defense after determining no excusable neglect on the part of Appellee, or (2) 
in using the federal standard comparing Rules 55(c) and 60(b) to determine good cause?  
1. Standard of Review:  As a threshold matter, a court’s ruling must be “based on 
adequate findings of fact” and “on the law.” May v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 
1110 (Utah 1984) (per curiam).  A decision premised on flawed legal conclusions, 
for instance, constitutes an abuse of discretion. Id.  Similarly, a trial court’s ruling 
on a motion to set aside a default involves the trial court’s discretionary power, 
and an appellate court will not disturb a trial court’s decision in such matters 
absent clear abuse of discretion. Miller v. Brocksmith, 825 P.2d 690, 693 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) (citations omitted).  The setting aside of a default under UTAH R. CIV. 
P. 55(c) lies within the sound discretion of the trial court, applying a standard of 
liberality and resolving all doubts in favor of the defaulting party. Id. (citations and 
internal quotations omitted). 
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2. Issue Preserved at:  [R. 479: 1-13 (Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant’s Renewed Motion for Set Aside Default (November 10, 2008)), 
attached hereto as Addendum “1”, pg. 1-13].1 [R. 498 (Ruling granting 
Defendant’s Renewed Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default (December 15, 
2008)), attached hereto as Addendum “2”]. [R. 510 (Order granting Defendant’s 
Renewed Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default (January 28, 2009)), attached 
hereto as Addendum “3”].  
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case.   
The underlying facts of this case involve Appellant Kenneth Davis’ (“Davis”) 
claims to real property located in American Fork, Utah County. [R. 012].  Appellee 
Dennis Goldsworthy (“Goldsworthy”) is the present title owner of the property, having 
received title to the property through Davis’ ex-wife, Edna Davis, who is now deceased. 
[R. 012: 2-3].  In his Complaint, Davis asserts a right to the property through an 
agreement with his ex-wife. [R. 012].  Specifically, Davis asserts that the transfers to 
Goldsworthy were in contravention to the agreement with his ex-wife, and were the result 
of undue influence and/or fraud. [R. 012]. 
2. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.    
Davis filed the present action on December 23, 2003. [R. 006].  In June 2005, 
                                            
1 Hereinafter, all citations to the trial court record shall be designated [R. __:__] indicating 
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Goldsworthy failed to appear at a regularly and properly scheduled deposition.  [R. 066; 
089].  As a result, Davis filed a Motion to Compel Goldsworthy’s attendance. [R. 089].  
Just prior to the hearing scheduled on the Motion, Goldsworthy’s counsel requested to 
withdraw from the case. [R. 108–124]. 
Pursuant to UTAH R. CIV. P. 74, Davis’ counsel mailed a Notice to Appear or 
Appoint to Goldsworthy via first class mail on September 20, 2005. [R. 130] This Notice 
was sent to Goldsworthy’s last known addresses. [R. 130].  As a result of Goldsworthy’s 
failure to appear on October 14, 2005 at the rescheduled hearing on Davis’ Motion to 
Compel, and his failure to attend the properly noticed deposition, the trial court struck 
Goldsworthy’s pleadings and entered default against him. [R. 134].  An order striking 
Goldsworthy’s pleadings was entered by the trial court on November 7, 2005. [R. 134]. 
Based on Davis’ Request for a Hearing on Damages and Equitable Relief, the 
Court set a hearing for February 3, 2006. [R. 136; 139].  Notice of this hearing was sent 
out by the Court on December 22, 2005. [R. 139].  On January 27, 2006, Gregory Hansen 
filed an appearance of counsel on Goldsworthy’s behalf and filed a Motion to Continue 
the Damages Hearing.  [R. 148; 150].  On February 2, 2006, Goldsworthy filed a Motion 
and Memorandum to Set Aside Default. [R. 156]. 
At the hearing on February 3, 2006, the trial court granted a continuance of the 
hearing on damages until the Motion to Set Aside Default could be heard on February 27, 
                                                                                                                                             
page number and line number separated by a colon. 
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2006. [R. 186].  At the hearing on February 27, 2006, the trial court granted the Motion to 
Set Aside Default when the trial court determined that the service of Notice to Appear or 
Appoint was inadequate. [R. 222].  This was not an issue raised or briefed by 
Goldsworthy but raised by the trial court sua sponte. [R. 222].  When the issue was 
raised, Davis’ counsel offered to brief the issue, but was denied.  On March 3, 2006, 
Davis’ counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s decision, citing 
controlling caselaw on the issue of service. [R. 232–237].  The Motion was denied on 
March 31, 2006. [R. 275].  Previously, on March 20, 2006, Goldsworthy filed a Rule 
12(b) Motion to Dismiss [R. 262], which was granted by the Court on August 7, 2006. [R. 
364].  An Order was entered on September 8, 2006 [R. 370]. A Notice of Appeal was 
filed by Davis on October 5, 2006. [R. 373].    
On April 24, 2008, the Court of Appeals issued a Memorandum Decision, 
reversing and remanding the case back to the trial court. [R. 390-386].   
On October 23, 2008, Goldsworthy filed a Memorandum in Support of Renewed 
Motion to Set Aside Default Judgment. [R. 423].  On November 10, 2008, Davis filed 
Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Renewed Motion to Set Aside 
Default. [R. 479].  On November 24, 2008, Goldsworthy filed Defendant’s Reply 
Memorandum to Plaintiff’s Opposition to Defendant’s Renewed Motion to Set Aside 
Default. [R. 490].  On December 16, 2008, Goldsworthy’s Renewed Motion to Set Aside 
Default was granted. [R. 498].  Davis filed a Notice of Appeal on January 7, 2009 [R. 
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501].  The trial court entered an Order on January 28, 2009. [R. 510].  
3. Statement of Facts 
 Given the unique posture of this case, many of the relevant facts are directly 
correlative to the procedural history culminating in the trial court’s decision to set aside 
the entry of default entered against Goldsworthy.  Accordingly, while the facts set forth 
herein may appear to be procedural, they are integrally important to the facts pertinent to 
Appellant’s appeal.    
This case began on December 23, 2003, when Davis filed a Complaint, and later 
on January 6, 2004, filed an Amended and Verified Complaint (the “Complaint”) against 
Goldsworthy wherein Davis claimed ownership of real property located in American 
Fork, Utah County. [R. 006; 012:2].  Goldsworthy is the present owner of the property, 
receiving title to the property through Davis’ ex-wife, Edna Davis, who is now deceased. 
[R. 012: 2-3].  In his Complaint, Davis alleged his claim to the property based on an 
agreement with his ex-wife. [R. 012: 4-6].  Davis further asserts that the transfer of title to 
Goldsworthy was in contravention of the agreement, and is the result of undue influence 
and/or fraud. [R. 012: 4-6].  
On May 5, 2005, Davis’ counsel scheduled a deposition of Goldsworthy to be held 
on Monday, June 13, 2005. [R: 066].  Davis’ counsel provided proper notice of said 
deposition to Goldsworthy and the Court. [R. 066:1].  Interestingly, Goldsworthy’s 
counsel arranged to appear at the deposition via telephone.  However, at the appointed 
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time of the deposition, Goldsworthy failed to appear although Goldsworthy’s counsel was 
present telephonically. [R. 166: 2].  On the record, Goldsworthy’s counsel confirmed that 
he had made several attempts to locate Goldsworthy but had been unable to do so. [R. 
166: 3].  Based on the fact that notice of the deposition was properly given, and lacking 
any other recourse, Davis filed a Motion to Compel Goldsworthy’s Attendance at 
Deposition. [R. 095].  The Court set a hearing on Davis’ Motion for September 2, 2005 
[R. 105].  Prior to the hearing, and despite the fact that a motion was pending, 
Goldsworthy’s counsel filed a Motion to Withdraw as Counsel. [R. 108].  
The basis for the Motion to Withdraw was that the Goldsworthy had failed to pay 
for the attorney services, failed to contact his counsel, and had moved out of the area to 
an unknown address. [R. 108: 1-2; 111: 1-2].  The trial court granted Mr. Jensen’s 
withdrawal despite Davis’ objection and without a hearing on the matter. [R. 122].  
Neither of the mailing certificates accompanying the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel nor 
the Declaration of James W. Jensen included Goldsworthy’s last known addresses. [R. 
108: 3; 111: 3].  Indeed, only the Notice of Entry of Order Permitting Withdrawal of 
Counsel contained an address for Goldsworthy, which was his business address. [R. 127: 
3]. 
 Because the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel did not include the last known 
address of Goldsworthy, upon entry of the Order permitting Goldsworthy’s counsel to 
withdraw, Davis’ counsel obtained Goldsworthy’s last known addresses from his former 
7 
 
counsel. [R. 375: 11-12].  Thereafter, pursuant to Rules 5(b)(1) and 74 of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, and out of an abundance of caution, Davis’ counsel served a Notice to 
Appear or Appoint to both Goldsworthy’s home address and Goldsworthy’s business 
address. [R. 130: 3].  At the continued hearing on October 14, 2005, and, as a result of 
Goldsworthy’s failure to appear, Davis’ Motion to Compel was granted and the trial court 
struck Goldsworthy’s pleadings and counterclaim. [R. 131].  The trial court then entered 
default against Goldsworthy for the relief requested. [R. 134:1].  Davis’ counsel prepared 
an order reflecting the Court’s ruling, a copy of which was mailed to Goldsworthy on 
October 19, 2005 to both addresses. [R. 134:3]. 
 However, because Davis’ Complaint did not contain a request for damages in a 
sum certain amount, other than title to the land, Davis requested a hearing on damages [R. 
136], and on December 22, 2005, the Court set a hearing on the issue of damages for 
February 3, 2006. [R. 139].  The request for hearing on damages was sent to both of 
Goldsworthy’s addresses. [R. 136: 2].  Further, the Court also sent notice of the hearing to 
Goldsworthy’s business and home addresses. [R. 139: 3].  The Notice sent to 
Goldsworthy’s business was returned to the Court as undeliverable. [R. 142].  
 On January 20, 2006, the Court received a letter dated January 16, 2006 from 
Goldsworthy indicating that he had received notice “from [his] ex-wife stating there is to 
be a hearing on February 3, 2006.”  [R. 146].  Goldsworthy claimed to have been unaware 
of the proceedings in the case “due to the fact that [he] no longer live[s] in Utah and now 
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live in Colorado.” [R. 146].  Goldsworthy further requested a continuance of the hearing 
so that he could get time off work and to acquire new counsel. [R. 146].  Immediately 
prior to the damages hearing, Attorney Gregory Hansen filed an appearance of counsel on 
Goldsworthy’s behalf, and simultaneously filed a Motion to Continue the Damages 
Hearing. [R. 148; 150].  The day prior to the damages hearing, Goldsworthy filed a 
Motion and Memorandum to Set Aside Default. [R. 156]. The next day, the Court granted 
a continuance until February 27, 2006 to provide the parties time to brief Goldsworthy’s 
Motion to Set Aside Default. [R. 186].  On March 20, 2006, Goldsworthy filed a Rule 
12(b) Motion to Dismiss. [R. 262].    
 Both parties filed Memoranda with the trial court, setting forth their respective 
positions.  [R. 156; R. 195].  A hearing was held on July 21, 2006, wherein counsel for 
both parties presented their oral arguments, and the Court sua sponte raised the issue of 
the method used to serve Goldsworthy with the Notice to Appear or Appoint. [R. 375: 11; 
R. 390:3-4].  Specially, the Court asserted that personal service was required.  Because 
personal service of the Notice has not occurred, the trial court granted Defendant’s 
Motion to Set Aside Entry of Default despite Davis’ objection and request to brief the 
issue. [R. 364: 2].  On August 7, 2006, the trial court entered a Memorandum Decision, 
awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to Davis. [R. 363: 3].  Also, the trial court granted 
Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. [R. 363: 7].   
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 Davis appealed. [R. 373].  On April 24, 2008, after determining that the facts and 
legal arguments were adequately presented in the briefs and the record, the Utah Court of 
Appeals entered a Memorandum Decision without aid of oral arguments. Davis v. 
Goldsworthy, 184 P.3d 626 (Utah Ct. App. 2008), attached hereto as Addendum “4”; [R. 
390].  The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court declaring the service adequate and 
remanding the matter back to the trial court for findings on the issue of good cause as trial 
court’s findings were insufficient for the appellate court to review. Id. at 629-30; [R. 390]. 
Specifically, this Court stated: “Because the trial court is in ‘an advantaged position to 
judge [Goldsworthy]’s credibility,’ and ‘inasmuch as [an] application to set aside default 
is equitable in nature, addressed to the conscience of the court, it can and should consider 
all the attendant facts and circumstances’ in deciding whether to set default aside.” Id. at 
630 (citing Bd. of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist. v. Cox, 384 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah 1963)); [R. 
390: 6-7] 
 A status conference was convened with the trial court and counsel on September 
19, 2008. [R. 407].  Thereafter, Goldsworthy filed a Motion and Memorandum in Support 
of Renewed Motion to Set Aside Default on October 23, 2008, wherein he presented 
arguments under Rules 55(c) and 60(b), asserting that Davis had not suffered any 
prejudice. [R. 423]. On November 10, 2008, Davis filed his Opposition Memorandum, 
wherein he demonstrated the relationships between Rules 55(c) and 60(b), established 
how Goldsworthy’s conduct could not legally constitute excusable neglect under any 
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standard, particularly because Goldsworthy willfully disregarded the processes of the 
court. [R. 479].  In his Reply Memorandum filed on November 24, 2008, Goldsworthy 
presented rebuttal arguments. [R. 490]. On December 16, 2009, Judge James A. Taylor of 
the Fourth District Court, without the benefit of oral argument, issued a written ruling 
granting Goldsworthy’s Renewed Motion to Set Aside Default. [R. 498].  In its ruling, the 
trial court clearly held that Goldsworthy’s conduct constituted “neglect, and that it 
[Goldsworthy’s conduct] was not excusable.” [R. 498: 3] (emphasis added).  Later in the 
ruling, however, the trial court also considered the issue of, and expressly found, that 
Goldsworthy had demonstrated a meritorious defense. [R. 498: 4].  Despite the expressed 
finding that Goldsworthy’s neglect was not excusable, and only after finding a 
meritorious defense, the trial court determined that there was good cause to set aside the 
entry of default in this case. [R. 498: 4].  Thereafter, Davis formally appealed the issue by 
filing a Notice of Appeal on January 7, 2009. [R. 501].  On January 28, 2009, the trial 
court entered an Order Granting Defendant’s Renewed Motion to Set Aside Entry of 
Default. [R. 510].   
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
 While Rule 55(c) governs the setting aside of an entry of default for good cause, 
the Rule 60(b) factors are relevant to that good cause determination.  Certainly, one of the 
Rule 60(b) factors is excusable neglect, which Goldsworthy argued and the trial court 
considered.  Goldsworthy also argued that he had a meritorious defense, which the trial 
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court erroneously considered.  However, the Court of Appeals has specified that the issue 
of meritorious defense only arises—and may only be considered by the court—after 
excusable neglect is found.   
Nevertheless, in its ruling and order setting aside the entry of default, the trial court 
not only considered the issue of meritorious defense, but also made the determination that 
Goldsworthy had presented a meritorious defense.  This finding constitutes an abuse of 
discretion after the trial court had already expressly found that Goldsworthy’s conduct 
did not constitute excusable neglect.  Specifically, by considering the meritorious defense, 
the trial court abused its discretion.  Accordingly, Davis seeks an order from this Court, 
reversing the trial court’s decision to set aside the entry of default against Goldsworthy, 
and remanding the action for a determination of damages on tow distinct grounds: (1) the 
abuse of discretion created by reviewing the defense after finding inexcusable neglect; 
and (2) the Rule 55(c) and 60(b) elements.     
ARGUMENT 
  
The trial court abused its discretion in setting aside the entry of default after 
finding that Goldsworthy’s conduct constituted neglect, and was not excusable, and after 
making this expressed finding, continued to consider and ultimately find a meritorious 
defense.  The law is clear, as stated by the Utah Court of Appeals, that the question of 
meritorious defense arises only if excusable neglect has been shown.  In this case, the trial 
court disregarded this standard, and found good cause anyway. 
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A. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion in Setting Aside Entry of Default by 
Determining Appellee’s Conduct Constituted Neglect that is Not Excusable, 
and then Continuing to Analyze and Ultimately Base its Decision to Set Aside 
the Entry of Default on the Basis of Meritorious Defense.  
 
 Rule 55(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure “governs the setting aside of a 
default prior to the entry of judgment.2 Miller v. Brocksmith, 825 P.2d 690, 693 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992) (citations omitted) (attached hereto as Addendum “5”). Under Rule 55(c), 
“[f]or good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by 
default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). UTAH 
R. CIV. P. 55(c) (emphasis added) (attached hereto as Addendum “6”).  In this case, as 
noted previously, an entry of default was entered, but not a default judgment. Therefore, 
the “good cause” standard under Rule 55(c), as applied by the trial court, is at issue in this 
appeal.   
In the Memorandum Decision issued previously in this case, this Court in dicta 
noted that under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, “there is a distinction between the 
entry of default and entry of default judgment.” [R. 390: 5].  Indeed, “the standards of 
setting aside a default may be less stringent than those for setting aside a default 
judgment.” [R. 390: 6].  However, when making this observation, this Court did not 
define the less stringent standard other than to note the existence of the distinction.  
                                            
2 Given that UTAH R. CIV. P. 55(c) and its federal counterpart, FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c), are 
“substantially identical, [the Utah Court of Appeals] freely refer[s] to authorities which 
have interpreted the federal rule.” Miller, 825 P. 2d at 693 (citing Gold Standard, Inc. v. 
American Barrick Resources Corp., 805 P.2d 164, 168 (Utah 1990) (citations omitted)).    
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Appellant speculates tat this is most likely because the current state of the law in this 
regard is unclear for the courts and litigants in this jurisdiction.   
While the issue is not fully defined in this State, the less stringent standard 
expressed by this Court is consistent with the distinction as expressed by other courts 
addressing the good cause standard required under Rule 55(c) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Dennis Garberg & Assocs., Inc. v. Pack-Tech Int'l Corp., 115 F.3d 767, 
775 n.6 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[I]t is well established that the good cause required by FED. R. 
CIV. P. 55(c) for setting aside entry of default poses a lesser standard for the defaulting 
party than the excusable neglect which must be shown for relief from judgment under 
FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)”).   
 While the standards for setting aside a default may be less stringent than those for 
setting aside a default judgment, there remains a close relationship between Rules 55(c) 
and 60(b).  Due to this close relationship, “courts faced with construing the somewhat 
nebulous good cause standard of FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c) have been inclined to look to the 
more specific grounds for relief enumerated in Rule 60(b) and regard them as included 
within the concept of good cause.” William H. Danne, Jr., J.D.,  Annotation, What 
Constitutes “Good Cause” Allowing Federal Court to Relieve Party of His Default under 
Rule 55(c) of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 29 A.L.R. FED. 7 (2009) (originally 
published in 1976). 
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However, addressing this relationship, the Utah Court of Appeals3 explained that 
“[w]hile Rule 55(c) distinguishes between the setting aside of a default and the setting 
aside of a default judgment under Rule 60(b), ‘the factors described in Rule 60(b) are 
relevant to a determination of whether defendant has shown good cause.’”4 Miller, 825 
P.2d at 693 (internal formatting and quotations omitted) (quoting Spica v. Garczynski, 78 
F.R.D. 134, 135 (E.D.Pa. 1978)).  In so stating, this Court has instructed courts in this 
State that the Rule 60(b) standards are relevant to, and thereby are included in, an analysis 
of the good cause standard required under UTAH R. CIV. P. 55(c).  See Id.  Therefore, 
under Utah law, any analysis of Rule 55(c) good cause standard begins with a 
consideration of factors provided under Rule 60(b), which permits relief from final 
judgments or orders upon grounds such as “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment..” UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1)&(6) (emphasis added) (attached hereto as 
Addendum “7”). 
In the case of Miller v. Brocksmith, the Utah Court of Appeals was faced with 
whether to set aside a default where the Appellant argued that the trial court erred in not 
setting aside the entry of default because of excusable neglect. 825 P.2d at 693.  
                                            
3 In its Ruling, the trial court mistakenly attributed this language to the Utah Supreme 
Court. [R. 498: 3].    
4 In paraphrasing the Miller decision, the trial court substitutes the word “are” for “can 
be” in this context. [R. 498: 3]. In Appellant’s view, this modification implies that the 
Rule 60(b) factors are only optionally relevant—which is inaccurate.      
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Accordingly, as stated in the words of this Court in that case, “the factors to be considered 
include whether [defendant’s] failure constitutes excusable neglect and whether 
[defendant] has presented a meritorious defense to the action.” Id.  Moreover, and most 
importantly, this Court in Miller sets forth the policy that “the question of meritorious 
defense arises only if excusable neglect had been shown.” Id. (citing State v. Musselman, 
667 P.2d 1053, 1056 (Utah 1983) (citing Bd. of Educ. of Granite Sch. Dist. v. Cox, 384 
P.2d 806 (Utah 1963))).  Not only does this policy apply to a court’s determination to set 
aside an entry of default, as was the case in Miller, it is also consistent with the policy in 
this jurisdiction concerning the setting aside of a default judgment.5 See e.g., Musselman, 
667 P.2d at 1056.  Indeed, a trial court is required to “consider and resolve the question of 
excusable neglect prior to its consideration of the issue of whether a meritorious defense 
exists.” Musselman, 667 P.2d at 1056 (internal parentheses omitted).  Expounding upon 
the policy further, the Utah Supreme Court explained “in accordance with this policy, it is 
unnecessary, and moreover inappropriate, to even consider the issue of meritorious 
defenses unless the court is satisfied that a sufficient excuse has been shown.”  Id. 
(emphasis added). 
                                            
5 In the context of setting aside an entry of default judgment, “a movant is entitled to have 
a default judgment set aside under 60(b) if (1) the motion is timely; (2) there is a basis for 
granting relief under one of the subsections of 60(b); and (3) the movant has alleged a 
meritorious defense. Menzies v. Galetka, 150 P.3d 480, 504 (Utah 2006) (citing Erickson 
v. Schenkers Int'l Forwarders, Inc., 882 P.2d 1147, 1149 (Utah 1994); Musselman, 667 
P.2d at 1055-56). Consistent with the policy outlined above for setting aside an entry of 
default, “these considerations [for setting aside a default judgment] should be addressed 
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Accordingly, the Utah Supreme Court’s order and instruction to trial courts 
requires the trial court to consider the factors of excusable neglect and meritorious 
defense in turn and in that prescribed order.  As support for his Renewed Motion, 
Goldsworthy argued claims of excusable neglect and meritorious defense [R. 423]—
reminiscent to the arguments presented by the defendant in the Miller case. See generally 
825 P.2d at 692-93.  However, in the instant case, the trial court failed to follow the prior 
directive as set forth by this Court. See Id.  In analyzing the Rule 60(b) factors as argued 
by Goldsworthy, the trial court remained steadfast to its previous determination.  
Specifically, Judge Taylor maintained his finding that Goldsworthy’s conduct was 
inexcusable and thus constituted neglect.  Specifically, “Mr. Goldsworthy’s conduct in 
failing to stay in touch with his Utah counsel after his unexpected relocation to Colorado, 
and his failure to appear at deposition and to be responsive to discovery was [the conduct 
which constituted] neglect, and that it was not excusable.” [R. 498: 3] (emphasis added).   
Applying Miller, once the trial court determined that Goldsworthy had not shown 
excusable neglect, the trial court’s analysis should have concluded without any further 
consideration of whether a meritorious defense existed.  However, in contravention of the 
directive set forth in Miller, the trial court continued forward with its analysis, ultimately 
determining that, despite his inexcusable neglect, Goldsworthy had demonstrated a 
meritorious defense (“while the default was due to the culpable conduct of the Mr. 
                                                                                                                                             
in a serial manner.” Id.     
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Goldsworthy, he has demonstrated a meritorious defense …”). [R. 498: 3].  
This course taken by the trial court—failing to conclude its analysis after 
determining that Goldsworthy’s neglect was inexcusable, considering and/or determining 
that a meritorious defense exists in this case, and thereby finding good cause on this 
flawed basis—constitutes an abuse of discretion by the trial court.  Because the trial 
court’s actions constitute an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s Ruling and Order should 
be reversed with instructions to hold the damages hearing and to transfer title to the 
property to Appellant.  
B. The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion by Using the Federal Standard 
Comparing Rules 55(c) and 60(b) to Determine Good Cause to Set Aside the 
Entry of Default.  
 
Next, given the trial court’s analysis, Appellant wishes to address the parallel 
standard employed by the federal courts when faced with a determination of “good cause” 
required under FED. R. CIV. P. 55(c).  Substantively, the federal standard is 
indistinguishable from the framework employed by Utah courts in analyzing good cause 
required under UTAH R. CIV. P. 55(c), and should therefore be addressed as part of 
Appellant’s brief.         
The trial court also abused its discretion under the federal standard employed by 
the trial court in its Ruling.  In particular, the federal standard is enumerated as follows: 
“[t]he principal factors in determining whether a defendant has met the good cause 
standard are (1) whether the default was the result of culpable conduct of the defendant, 
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(2) whether the plaintiff would be prejudiced if the default should be set aside, and (3) 
whether the defendant presented a meritorious defense.” Hunt v. Ford Motor Co., 65 F.3d 
178, *3 (10th Cir. 1995) (citing In re Dierschke, 975 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1992)).  In 
its Ruling, the trial court set forth this standard as stated by the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Utah in Muscat v. Prime West Jordanelle, L.L.C.6 [R. 498: 3], and appears to 
base its analysis thereon. See No. 2:08-CV-420 TS, 2008 WL 4753715, at *2 (D. Utah 
Oct. 28, 2008).   
Comparing both the Utah and federal standards, the federal standard (as relied 
upon by the trial court) provides an additional layer to the analysis as discussed below.  In 
considering the three principal factors, courts are instructed that “[t]hese factors are not 
‘talismanic’ and the court may consider other factors.” Hunt, 65 F.3d 178, at *3 (citation 
omitted).  Importantly, however, as discussed by the court in Muscat, “[i]f the default was 
the result of the defendant’s culpable conduct, the district court may refuse to set aside the 
default on that basis alone.” 2008 WL 4753715, at *2 (citing Hunt, 65 F.3d 178, at *3). 
In general, “a defendant’s conduct is considered culpable if he has defaulted 
willfully or has no excuse for the default.” Id. (citation omitted).  Comparing the 
standards for culpable conduct and excusable neglect, it is clear that the two are 
substantively identical.  In fact, the trial court in this case was consistent by finding 
                                            
6 In its Ruling, the trial court inaccurately attributes this holding to the Tenth Circuit Court 
of Appeals while the citing to Muscat, a slip decision issued by the U.S. District Court for 
the District of Utah, Central Division. [R. 498: 3].        
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Goldsworthy’s default the result of both (i) neglect which was not excusable [R. 498: 3], 
and (ii) the result of culpable conduct (“[w]hile the default was the result of culpable 
conduct of Mr. Goldsworthy, . . .”) [R. 498: 3].  Therefore, in Appellant’s view, the result 
is the same under either the directive prescribed by this Court (excusable neglect) or by 
the federal standard (culpable conduct).  Furthermore, based upon this determination 
alone, the trial court should have refused to set aside the entry of default and clearly was 
proscribed from any further analysis.  See Hunt, 65 F.3d 173 at *3.   
Next, Appellant recognizes that the federal standard introduces another layer, an 
additional factor to be considered by the trial court—whether the plaintiff in this case, 
Davis, would be prejudiced if the default should be set aside. See Id.  While this factor 
may not be expressly considered pursuant to the Utah standard, it certainly is inherently 
considered as part of a trial court’s broad discretion in such a determination.  In 
particular, however, the trial court in this case turns this factor on its head by considering, 
and ultimately finding, that the defendant Goldsworthy would be severely prejudiced 
should his Renewed Motion not be granted (“. . . it cannot be said that Mr. Davis will be 
prejudiced by this Court granting the present motion.  In fact, Mr. Goldsworthy would be 
severely prejudiced should the motion not be granted”) [R. 498: 4].  However, the second 
principle factor is described as “whether the plaintiff would be prejudiced if the default 
should be set aside.”  See Hunt, 65 F.3d 173 at *3 (emphasis added).  Despite this 
distinction, however, the trial court continues on to point out that, if the Renewed Motion 
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were not granted, Davis “would then prevail in a case where this Court ruled that he 
failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” [R. 498: 4].  Accordingly, the 
trial court would “not allow a default to stand which would eventually lead to default 
judgment against a party who should prevail on the merits.” [R. 498: 4].   
In so reasoning, the trial court seems to rely on its equitable authority to bar Davis 
from recovery in this case on the basis of a technicality.  However, given the current 
posture of this case, either party that ultimately prevails will do so as a result of some 
species of technicality, and the actual merits of the case will never be considered.  When 
the trial court granted Appellee’s 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss, it did so based upon a 
Statute of Frauds defense—the lack of a sufficient writing to demonstrate the existence of 
the alleged oral agreement to transfer a parcel of real property to Davis from his deceased 
ex-wife.  In its most general sense, the effect that the Statue of Frauds has in this case 
precludes Davis from ever having a court weigh the evidence or consider testimony in 
this case.  Indeed, for that very purpose, Davis scheduled the deposition of Goldsworthy, 
which he failed to attend (and if the current Ruling is allowed to stand with result in 
Goldsworthy profiting by this willful disregard for the judicial system and its processes), 
and started the series of events leading to the present day.   
Similar to prevailing on a Statute of Frauds basis, if Appellant prevails in this 
action, it will be because of certain procedural technicalities—procedural “Statutes of 
Fraud”—that preclude parties to legal proceedings from being derelict in their duty to be 
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responsive to other parties and/or the court during the pendency of such proceedings.   
In sum, for the trial court to only consider and find potential prejudice on the part 
of Goldsworthy as a defendant, and not Davis as plaintiff, is not only contradictory to 
what the federal standard contemplates, but it is also at odds with the trial court’s ultimate 
ruling in the case—granting a motion to dismiss based on a legal technicality requiring a 
writing or the like.   
The third and final factor contemplated by the federal standard is meritorious 
defense.  Again, since the trial court found both inexcusable neglect and/or culpable 
conduct in this case, the analysis should have concluded prior to any consideration of the 
issues of meritorious defense by the trial court.   
CONCLUSION AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF 
 For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court’s ruling setting 
aside the entry of default, enter default against Goldsworthy, and remand the matter to the 
trial court for a hearing on general damages while simultaneously quieting title to the real 
property in the Appellant.  
Respectfully submitted this          day of May, 2009. 
HEIDEMAN, MCKAY, HEUGLY & OLSEN, L.L.C. 
 
 
        
     BRADLEY J. WEBER, 
Attorney for Appellant Kenneth Davis 
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statutes’ common purpose, we hold that
Fringe Benefits are part of ‘‘the reasonable
value of the labor’’ as contemplated by the
private bond statute.
¶ 51 The Supreme Court of Iowa reached a
similar conclusion in Dobbs v. Knudson, Inc.,
292 N.W.2d 692 (Iowa 1980), where it held
that fringe benefits were part of a ‘‘claim for
TTT labor,’’ explaining:
Whether a claim is for labor or service is
determined not by the nature of what the
claimant receives but rather by the nature
of what is done to be entitled to receive it.
The issue, therefore, is not whether the
payments to the trust funds are fringe
benefits or wages but whether the employ-
ees TTT performed labor or service to be-
come entitled to the payments on their
behalf. TTT
TTT Thus we hold that the payments to
the trusts are for labor within the meaning
of [the public bond statute].
Id. at 695 (emphasis added) (citation omit-
ted);  see also, e.g., United States Fid. &
Guar. Co. v. Arizona State Carpenters
Health & Welfare Trust Fund, 120 Ariz. 79,
584 P.2d 60, 62 (Ct.App.1978) (unpaid fringe
benefits were ‘‘a cost of labor’’ under private
bond statute).  We agree that the beneficia-
ries performed labor on the Project ‘‘to be-
come entitled to the [Fringe Benefits],’’ see
Dobbs, 292 N.W.2d at 694, and that those
benefits are part of the reasonable value of
the labor.
CONCLUSION
¶ 52 The Funds have standing to pursue
claims under Utah’s mechanics’ lien and pri-
vate bond statutes, neither of those statutes
is preempted by ERISA section 514, and
Fringe Benefits are recoverable as part of
the value of the labor provided to the Pro-
ject.  Because we reverse the trial court’s
grant of partial summary judgment in favor
of Appellees, we likewise reverse the trial
court’s award of costs and attorney fees to
Appellees.
¶ 53 Reversed.
¶ 54 WE CONCUR:  PAMELA T.
GREENWOOD, Presiding Judge, RUS-
SELL W. BENCH, Judge.
,
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Kenneth DAVIS, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
Dennis GOLDSWORTHY, Defendant
and Appellee.
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Background:  Former husband of de-
ceased property owner sued record ti-
tleholder of the property, alleging he
obtained the property through undue in-
fluence or fraud. After defendant failed
to appear at a deposition scheduled by
the court, default was entered against
him. Defendant moved for relief from
default judgment, which was granted.
On plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration,
the Fourth District Court, Provo De-
partment, James R. Taylor, J., denied
the motion and dismissed the complaint
for failure to state a claim upon which
relief could be granted. Plaintiff appeal-
ed.
Holdings:  The Court of Appeals, Orme,
J., held that:
(1) service of notice to appear or appoint
counsel on defendant by mail to his last
known address was adequate, and
(2) remand was required for findings as to
whether defendant demonstrated ex-
cusable neglect or other good cause for
relief from default judgment.
Reversed and remanded.
lands.’’ (emphasis added) (first alteration in orig- inal)).
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1. Judgment O92
The law disfavors default judgments.
2. Judgment O139
Although a trial court has broad discre-
tion in deciding whether to set aside a default
judgment, that discretion is not unlimited.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 60(b).
3. Appeal and Error O957(1)
Reviewing court will overturn a trial
court’s decision to set aside a default if it has
abused its discretion.  Rules Civ.Proc., Rule
60(b).
4. Judgment O139, 163
As a threshold matter, a court’s ruling
whether or not to grant relief from a default
judgment must be based on adequate find-
ings of fact and on the law, and while the
trial court should exercise its discretion in
furtherance of justice and should incline to-
wards granting relief in a doubtful case to
the end that the party may have a hearing, a
decision premised on flawed legal conclusions
constitutes an abuse of discretion.  Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 60(b).
5. Attorney and Client O76(1)
 Pretrial Procedure O127
Service of notice to appear personally at
hearing on motion to compel defendant’s ap-
pearance at deposition or to appoint new
counsel, after motion to withdraw by defen-
dant’s counsel was granted, was properly
made on defendant by mailing the notice by
first class mail to defendant’s last known
home address and last known business ad-
dress.  Rules Civ.Proc., Rules 5(b)(1), 74(c).
6. Judgment O143(3)
To demonstrate that the default was due
to excusable neglect, the movant, on a motion
for relief from default judgment, must show
that he has used due diligence and that he
was prevented from appearing by circum-
stances over which he had no control.  Rules
Civ.Proc., Rule 60(b).
7. Appeal and Error O1169(8)
Remand to the trial court was necessary
for findings as to whether defendant seeking
relief from default demonstrated excusable
neglect or other good cause required for such
relief, where trial court erroneously granted
relief from default on grounds that service of
notice to appear or appoint counsel sent by
plaintiff after defendant’s counsel had with-
drawn was inadequate.  Rules Civ.Proc.,
Rule 60(b).
Justin D. Heideman and Lorelei Naegle,
Provo, for Appellant.
Gregory Hansen, American Fork, for Ap-
pellee.
Before THORNE, Associate P.J., DAVIS
and ORME, JJ.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
ORME, Judge:
¶ 1 We have determined that ‘‘[t]he facts
and legal arguments are adequately present-
ed in the briefs and record and the decisional
process would not be significantly aided by
oral argument.’’  Utah R.App. P. 29(a)(3).
Moreover, the issues, as presented, are
readily resolved under applicable law.
¶ 2 Plaintiff Kenneth Davis appeals from
the trial court’s decision to grant defendant
Dennis Goldsworthy’s rule 60(b) motion and
set aside a default entered against Goldswor-
thy.  Had the default not been set aside,
Davis would have proceeded to obtain a de-
fault judgment for damages resulting from
his being denied ownership of his deceased
ex-wife’s real property in American Fork,
Utah.
¶ 3 Davis filed suit on December 23, 2003,
claiming ownership of his deceased ex-wife’s
real property pursuant to an oral agreement.
He also claimed that Goldsworthy, the record
title-holder of the property, obtained the
property as a result of undue influence or
fraud.  On May 5, 2005, Davis sent notice of
Goldsworthy’s June 13 deposition to Gold-
sworthy’s attorney.  On the appointed day,
Goldsworthy did not appear.  Goldsworthy’s
attorney acknowledged that despite several
attempts, he had been unable to locate or
contact Goldsworthy.  Davis filed a motion to
compel Goldsworthy’s attendance at the de-
position, and the court scheduled a hearing
on the motion for September 2.
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¶ 4 Before the hearing, Goldsworthy’s at-
torney filed a motion to withdraw based on
Goldsworthy’s failure to pay for legal ser-
vices, his failure to communicate with coun-
sel, and his apparent relocation to an un-
known address.  The court granted the
motion to withdraw and continued the Sep-
tember 2 hearing to October 14.  Davis
sent a notice to appear personally or ap-
point new counsel by first class mail to
Goldsworthy’s last known home and busi-
ness addresses on September 20.  See
Utah R. Civ. P. 74(c).  Goldsworthy did
not appear at the October 14 hearing, so
the trial court struck his pleadings and en-
tered his default.
¶ 5 Because Davis’s complaint requested
unspecified damages, Davis requested—and
the court scheduled—a hearing to establish
damages.  The hearing was set for February
3, 2006.  Both Davis’s request and the court’s
notice of hearing were also sent by first class
mail to Goldsworthy’s last known home and
business addresses.
¶ 6 On January 20, 2006, the trial court
received a letter from Goldsworthy, who had
moved to Colorado, requesting a thirty-day
continuance so he could obtain new counsel
and get time off work to attend the hearing.1
Shortly thereafter, his new counsel entered
an appearance and moved the court to set
aside Goldsworthy’s default. The court con-
tinued the February 3 hearing to February
27.
¶ 7 In his memorandum supporting his mo-
tion to set aside default, Goldsworthy stated
that
[he] was going through a divorce at the
time this litigation began, and was re-
quired to shut down his business, and
move [to] Colorado.  His only stable ad-
dress was that of his business.  When he
moved, he had no forwarding address.  He
had not been able to communicate with his
former counsel TTT since May of 2005, and
moved the first week of June, 2005, which
was when the Subpoena Duces Tecum was
served on his counsel.  [His] counsel did
not inform him of the Subpoena or the
deposition, and then withdrew in Septem-
ber of 2005 without informing him of the
status of the case.
TTT [D]ifficulties in his life at the time
were so distracting and consuming that he
neglected to pay attention to the lawsuit.
Goldsworthy further asserted that ‘‘he did
not receive the Notice to Appear or Appoint
Counsel because it was not mailed to him,’’
that ‘‘the claims made by the Plaintiff in this
case are false,’’ and that ‘‘setting aside the
default in this case would not result in sub-
stantial injustice to the Plaintiff.  He would
only be required to pursue this case on the
merits, and will lose nothing if his claims are
meritorious.’’
¶ 8 At the hearing, the trial court inter-
rupted Davis’s counsel during argument and
raised the issue of notice:
THE JUDGE:  Counsel, I want you to
back up and address another problem that
I’m concerned about first.
TTTT
TTTT How did you obtain service of your
notice to appear or appoint?
TTTT
TTTT Under Rule 74 how did you obtain
service TTT [?]
TTTT
MS. NAEGLE:  Simply mailed it.
THE JUDGE:  And is it your position
that that’s adequate under the rules?
MR. HEIDEMAN:  I believe it is, Your
HonorTTTT
THE JUDGE:  Can you cite me to a rule
that states that that’s all the service that’s
required?
MR. HEIDEMAN:  TTT I don’t have a
rule off of the top of my head but I’m
happy to research and provide a written
memorandum to the court on that position.
THE JUDGE:  Well, I’m troubled by
thatTTTT [S]imply mailing that to an ad-
dress without return receipt requested,
without other proof of service which would
1. Goldsworthy also wrote:
I am writing this letter in regard to a notice I
received from my ex-wife stating there is to be
a hearing on February 3, 2006.  I was not
aware of the ongoing situation with case num-
ber 030405431 due to the fact that I no longer
live in Utah and now live in Colorado.
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be required for a summons or complaint,
or effecting personal service of the notice
which was required under the old rule, I’m
puzzled as to how that, that gives the court
jurisdiction to go forward.
On that basis, the court then decided to set
aside the default, but it awarded attorney
fees to Davis, commenting, ‘‘Well it only gets
you so farTTTT Mr. Goldsworthy, you have
been less than diligent in maintaining contact
with your attorneys and this court, it’s going
to cost you.’’  Shortly thereafter, Davis filed
a motion for reconsideration.  In his support-
ing memorandum, he briefed the notice issue
relied on by the court.  The court denied
that motion and ultimately dismissed Davis’s
action for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.  See Utah R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).  Davis appealed.2
¶ 9 On appeal, Davis contends that the trial
court abused its discretion when it set aside
Goldsworthy’s default.  Specifically, Davis
argues that the trial court erred in finding
service of his rule 74 notice was inadequate.
He also argues that Goldsworthy failed to
prove excusable neglect, one of the grounds
under rule 60(b) that would justify setting
aside a default judgment.3  See Utah R. Civ.
P. 60(b).
[1–3] ¶ 10 ‘‘[T]he law disfavors default
judgments[.]’’ 4  Black’s Title, Inc. v. Utah
State Ins. Dep’t, 1999 UT App 330, ¶ 5, 991
P.2d 607.  See Darrington v. Wade, 812 P.2d
452, 456 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (‘‘[D]efault judg-
ment is an unusually harsh sanction that
should be meted out with caution[.]’’).  Al-
though ‘‘a trial court has broad discretion in
deciding whether to set aside a default judg-
ment,’’ that ‘‘discretion is not unlimited.’’
Lund v. Brown, 2000 UT 75, ¶ 9, 11 P.3d 277.
We will overturn a trial court’s decision to
set aside a default if it has abused its discre-
tion.  See id. ¶¶ 9–11.
[4] ¶ 11 ‘‘As a threshold matter, a court’s
ruling must be ‘based on adequate findings of
fact’ and ‘on the law.’ ’’  Id. ¶ 9 (quoting May
v. Thompson, 677 P.2d 1109, 1110 (Utah
1984) (per curiam)).  While the trial court
should exercise its discretion ‘‘in furtherance
of justice and should incline towards granting
relief in a doubtful case to the end that the
party may have a hearing,’’ Helgesen v. In-
yangumia, 636 P.2d 1079, 1081 (Utah 1981),
‘‘[a] decision premised on flawed legal conclu-
sions TTT constitutes an abuse of discretion.’’
Lund, 2000 UT 75, ¶ 9, 11 P.3d 277.
¶ 12 Rule 74(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure provides:  ‘‘If an attorney with-
draws TTT, the opposing party shall serve a
Notice to Appear or Appoint Counsel on the
unrepresented party, informing the party of
the responsibility to appear personally or
appoint counsel.’’  Utah R. Civ. P. 74(c).
Rule 5 explains how service of papers other
than a summons and complaint is to be made:
‘‘Service TTT upon a party shall be made by
2. There is no question that Davis can challenge
the trial court’s interlocutory order setting aside
the default once a final judgment has been en-
tered.  See Zions First Nat’l Bank v. Rocky Moun-
tain Irrigation, Inc., 931 P.2d 142, 144 (Utah
1997) (‘‘When an appellant files a notice of ap-
peal from a final judgment, he may, in his open-
ing brief, challenge all nonfinal prior orders and
happenings which led up to that final judg-
ment.’’) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).  Davis has not pursued on appeal the
propriety of the trial court’s ruling dismissing his
complaint for failure to state a claim.
3. Davis also argues that the trial court erred in
denying his motion for reconsideration.  In do-
ing so, the court stated, ‘‘The motion [for recon-
sideration] questions the Court’s reasoning and
analysis but does not present arguments that
could not have been made in connection with the
motion [to set aside the default].’’  Davis com-
plains that because the trial court raised the
issue of adequate notice sua sponte at the prior
hearing, it was appropriate for him to argue the
point later, after he had an opportunity to re-
search it.  Because we agree with Davis that the
court erred in determining that his rule 74 notice
was inadequately served, we need not address
this issue.
4. We note that under our rules of civil proce-
dure, there is a distinction between the entry of
default and the entry of a default judgment.  See
Utah R. Civ. P. 55(a)-(b).  Here, the trial court
entered Goldsworthy’s default but not a default
judgment because the trial court had not yet
reached the question of damages.  See id.
55(b)(2).  The parties did not recognize this dis-
tinction below, and their arguments on appeal
assume that the standards for setting a default
judgment aside apply equally to setting aside the
entry of default.  We consider the appeal on the
terms framed by the parties but do not, thereby,
accept the correctness of their shared assump-
tion.  See infra note 6.
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delivering a copy or by mailing a copy to the
last known address or, if no address is
known, by leaving it with the clerk of the
court.’’  Id. 5(b)(1) (current version at Utah
R. Civ. P. 5(b)(1)(A)(i)-(vii)).
[5] ¶ 13 The only reason the court dis-
cussed when setting aside Goldsworthy’s de-
fault was inadequate service of the notice to
appoint counsel or appear personally.  Davis,
however, effected service of the notice in
accordance with rule 5(b)(1).  He sent his
notice by first class mail to both Goldswor-
thy’s last known home and last known busi-
ness addresses.  Under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, this was sufficient notice.
See id.  See also Remington–Rand, Inc. v.
O’Neil, 4 Utah 2d 270, 293 P.2d 416, 417
(1956) (stating that ‘‘ ‘[s]ervice by mail is
complete upon mailing’ ’’ and that proof of
such service is ‘‘a simple matter’’) (citation
omitted).  The trial court therefore erred in
determining that service was inadequate.5
[6] ¶ 14 Rule 60(b) allows a court ‘‘upon
such terms as are just’’ and ‘‘in the further-
ance of justice’’ to relieve a party from a
judgment for ‘‘mistake, inadvertence, sur-
prise, or excusable neglect;  TTT or TTT any
other reason justifying relief.’’  Utah R. Civ.
P. 60(b).  Goldsworthy’s theory before the
trial court was essentially one of excusable
neglect.  ‘‘To demonstrate that the default
was due to excusable neglect, ‘[t]he movant
must show that he has used due diligence
and that he was prevented from appearing
by circumstances over which he had no con-
trol.’ ’’  Black’s Title, Inc., 1999 UT App 330,
¶ 10, 991 P.2d 607 (quoting Airkem Inter-
mountain, Inc. v. Parker, 30 Utah 2d 65, 513
P.2d 429, 431 (1973)) (alteration in original).
‘‘In the absence of such a showing, [a default-
ing party]’s assertion does not demonstrate
his neglect was excusable.’’  Id.
[7] ¶ 15 We cannot determine, based ei-
ther on the trial court’s comments from the
bench or its minute entry, whether it be-
lieved Goldsworthy’s admitted neglect was
sufficiently excusable to justify relief on that
basis, totally aside from the notice ground on
which the court erroneously premised its de-
cision.  Nor can we determine whether the
trial court believed there was otherwise good
cause to set aside the default.6  Because the
trial court is in ‘‘an advantaged position to
judge [Goldsworthy]’s credibility,’’ and ‘‘inas-
much as [an] application to set aside a default
is equitable in nature, addressed to the con-
science of the court, it can and should consid-
er all of the attendant facts and circum-
stances’’ in deciding whether to set a default
aside.  Board of Educ. v. Cox, 14 Utah 2d
385, 384 P.2d 806, 808 (1963).  Accordingly,
we reverse and remand to the trial court for
the detailed findings required under Utah
case law and for such orders as may then be
appropriate.7
5. The Utah Supreme Court and this court have
previously held that an agency did not have to
ensure actual notice in cases where the com-
plaining parties were required to keep the agen-
cies apprised of their current addresses.  See
Anderson v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 839 P.2d 822,
825–26 (Utah 1992);  Black’s Title, Inc. v. Utah
State Ins. Dept., 1999 UT App 330, ¶¶ 11–14, 991
P.2d 607.  Similar principles and policy con-
cerns are also present here.  If we embraced a
requirement that an opposing party must ensure
actual notice by taking steps above and beyond
compliance with the rule’s service requirements,
as suggested by the trial court, we would ‘‘en-
courage[ ] evasion of service.’’  Black’s Title,
Inc., 1999 UT App 330, ¶ 14, 991 P.2d 607.  See
Anderson, 839 P.2d at 826.  Cf. Meadow Fresh
Farms, Inc. v. Utah State Univ., 813 P.2d 1216,
1220 & n. 7 (Utah Ct.App.1991) (holding
‘‘[p]laintiff’s claim that [an] order of dismissal
must be vacated because he did not have person-
al notice of the hearing [to be] without merit’’
when the defendant’s attorney received notice of
the hearing pursuant to rule 5(b)(1) but failed to
appear).
6. Despite the parties’ shared assumption, see su-
pra note 4, the standards for setting aside a
default may be less stringent than those for set-
ting aside a default judgment.  A trial court may
set aside a default, as in the case here, ‘‘[f]or
good cause shown,’’ but it may set aside a default
judgment only ‘‘in accordance with Rule 60(b).’’
Utah R. Civ. P. 55(c).  See Calder Bros. Co. v.
Anderson, 652 P.2d 922, 926 n. 4 (Utah 1982).
7. To set aside a default judgment, Utah case law
requires not only a showing of excusable neglect
or one of the other grounds under rule 60(b), but
also the availability of a meritorious defense. See
Hernandez v. Baker, 2004 UT App 462, ¶ 3, 104
P.3d 664;  Black’s Title, Inc., 1999 UT App 330,
¶ 6, 991 P.2d 607. See also Lund v. Brown, 2000
UT 75, ¶ 28, 11 P.3d 277 (discussing requirement
of showing meritorious defense).  Even assuming
the same criteria apply to setting aside defaults
as to setting aside default judgments, see supra
notes 4 and 6, this latter requirement need not
concern the trial court on remand, given the
peculiar posture of this case.  The trial court,
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Background:  After denying motion by
child’s mother and great-grandparents for
a child protection order against child’s fa-
ther, the Juvenile Court, Third District,
West Jordan Department, Elizabeth A.
Lindsley, J., entered an order awarding
father attorney fees and costs. Child’s
mother and great-grandparents appealed.
Holdings:  The Court of Appeals, Davis,
J., held that:
(1) finding that allegations of abuse were
‘‘unsubstantiated’’ was insufficient to
support award, but
(2) amount of award was reasonable.
Affirmed in part and remanded in part.
1. Infants O248.1
An appellate court reviews a juvenile
court’s application of the rule governing
award of attorney fees in child protection
proceedings for correctness.  Juvenile Proce-
dure Rule 37(d).
2. Appeal and Error O984(5)
 Costs O194.18
A trial court has broad discretion in
determining what constitutes a reasonable
fee, and the appellate court will consider that
determination against an abuse-of discretion
standard.
3. Infants O212
Finding in order of juvenile court, that
allegations of abuse against child’s father
were unsubstantiated, rather than on the ba-
sis that the allegations were without merit,
as required to support an attorney fee award
under the rules of juvenile procedure, was
insufficient to support award of attorney fees
and costs to child’s father, after denial of
child protective order against father.  Juve-
nile Procedure Rule 37(d); West’s U.C.A.
§ 62A–4a–101.
4. Appeal and Error O1177(8)
If an appellate court determines that
findings of fact are insufficient to support a
necessary legal conclusion, the appellate
court will normally remand the matter for
further proceedings.
5. Costs O208
Part of the trial court’s function in attor-
ney fee deliberations depends on an under-
standing and proper interpretation of the
applicable legal standard.
6. Infants O13.5(2)
An ex parte petition for a child protec-
tive order does not qualify as a ‘‘report’’
under the statute providing immunity from
civil or criminal liability for a person who
participates in good faith in making a report
of child abuse, because a juvenile judge is not
a peace officer, law enforcement agency, or
office of the Division of Child and Family
Services (DCFS).  West’s U.C.A. § 62A–4a–
410(1).
after setting aside the default, dismissed the com-
plaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted given the complaint’s invia-
bility under the statute of frauds.  See Utah Code
Ann. § 25–5–1 (2007).  In appealing after entry
of the final judgment in this matter, Davis did
not pursue an appeal of that decision, thereby
conceding the correctness of the dismissal of his
complaint.  He thus basically puts all of his eggs
in one basket by seeking in this appeal only to
have Goldsworthy’s default reinstated—a first
step to obtaining, by default, a judgment he im-
plicitly concedes he could not obtain on any
other basis.
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Addendum 6 
 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 55 (2009). 
Rule 55. Default.
(a) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by
these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter the default of that party.
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows:
(b)(1) By the clerk. Upon request of the plaintiff the clerk shall enter judgment for the amount claimed and costs against the defendant if
:
(b)(1)(A) the default of the defendant is for failure to appear ;
(b)(1)(B) the defendant is not an infant or incompetent person;
(b)(1)(C) the defendant has been personally served pursuant to Rule 4(d)(1); and
(b)(1)(D) the claim against the defendant is for a sum certain or for a sum that can be made certain by computation.
(b)(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable
the court to enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account or to determine the amount of damages or to
establish the truth of any averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, the court may conduct such hearings
or order such references as it deems necessary and proper.
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been
entered, may likewise set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b).
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this rule apply whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is
a plaintiff, a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counterclaim. In all cases a judgment by default is subject to
the limitations of Rule 54(c).
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judgment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against
an officer or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court.
Rule 55 http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/urcp055.html
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Addendum 7 
 
UTAH R. CIV. P. 60 (2009). 
 
 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order.
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or
omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as
the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is docketed in the appellate
court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court.
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could
not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or
extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied,
released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable
that the judgment should have prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), or (3),not more than 3 months after the judgment, order, or
proceeding was entered or taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its operation.
This rule does not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or proceeding
or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as
prescribed in these rules or by an independent action.
Advisory Committee Notes
Rule 60 http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/urcp060.html
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